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SOLDIERS AND SA1L0Rs-C1v1L ~ELIEF AcT OF 1940-APPLICATION TO DECEDENTS' ESTATES, SECURED OBLIGATIONS, INSTALLMENT
CoNTRACTs, INSURANCE, TAXEs, AND AssESSMENTs-On October 17,
I 940, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act1 became effective. Its
purpose, as stated in the first section, is as follows:
"In order to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense under the emergent conditions, which are threatening the peace and security of the United States and to enable the
United States the more successfully to fulfill the requirements of
the national defense, provision is hereby made to suspend enforcement of civil liabilities, in certain cases, of persons in the military
service of the United States in order to enable such persons to
devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the nation, and
to this end the following provisions are made for the temporary
1

54 Stat. L. n78 (1940); 50 U.S. C. A. App.§.§ 501-585.
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suspension of legal proceedings and transactions which may prejudice the civil rights of persons in such service during the period
herein specified over which this Act remains in force."
This statute follows closely the text of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act of March 8, 1918.2 The act of 1918 was prepared in the
office of the Judge Advocate General at Washington, and is said to have
been drawn by the late John H. Wigmore. 8 In an article in the Illinois
Law Review 4 by Mansfield Ferry, of the New York Bar, Samuel
Rosenbaum, then draftsman to the American Judicature Society, and
John H. Wigniore, the authors state that they assisted in preparing
the draft which came from the office of the Judge Advocate General.
The 1940 act consists of six articles entitled as follows: General
Provisions; General Relief; Rent, Installment Contracts, Mortgages;
Insurance; Taxes and Public Lands; Administrative Remedies. The
general relief provided includes a temporary stay of proceedings in
which the person in military service is a party; the appointment of an
attorney to represent such person; the vacation of judgments or decree~; the extension of periods of limitation by the period of military
service.
The I 940 act was modified, and in general its scope was extended,
by an amendment effective October 6, 1942.5 The class of persons
within the protection of the act was enlarged. Without attempting a
complete statement of the effect of this enactment, the following summary may be made. Four new sections were added to article I. Section 20 5 of article II, as to the period of limitations, was extended to
include proceedings before administrative tribunals and was made
applicable to the period of redemption for real ~state sold under mortgages and other obligations. Doubtless, this last modification was a
result of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Ebert v. Poston,° to the effect that the corresponding section of
the 191 8 act was inapplicable to such a period of redemption. A new
section, namely 207, specifically excluded from the operation of 205
"any period of limitation prescribed by or under the internal revenue
laws of the United States." Section 206, limiting the rate of interest
on interest bearing obligations of service men was also added to article
II. Article III was amended by the addition of several new sections,
including a section extending the benefit of the article to dependents
2

40 Stat. L. 440 (1918); 50 U.S. C. A. App.§§ 101-165.
Bendetson, "A Discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940,"
2 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1940).
4
Ferry, Rosenbaum and Wigmore, "The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Rights Bill,"
12 ILL. L. REv. 449 (1918).
15
56 Stat. L. 769 (1942); 50 U.S. C. A. App.§§--.
6
266 U.S. 548, 45 S. Ct. 188 (1925).
8
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of a person in military service. Article IV on insurance was repealed
and an entire new article was substituted. At the end. of the act a new
article, entitled "Further Relief," was added.
The discussions which follow, written by different authors, do not
cover the entire act, but only the parts indicated by the various headings.-Ed.
Decedents' Estates
At the outset, the question may be raised whether the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act 7 now in force has any direct application to the
administration of decedents' estates. As will more fully appear in the
discussion which follows, several of its sections are believed to be applicable. Yet among the special matters dealt with in the statute, such
as mortgages, leases, in,stallment contracts, life insurance and public
lands, decedents' estates are not singled out for separate treatment.
Moreover, the following statement which appeared in an article written
by three men who participated in drafting the Civil Relief Act of I 9 I 8,
from which the present act was directly derived, is not without significance: 8
"A number of subjects were considered for inclusion in this
bill, but were rejected for various reasons. In the cases of partnership and bankruptcy it was at first thought desirable to prohibit
proceedings adverse to the soldier or sailor looking to dissolution
or bankruptcy; it was, however, decided to be unwise to make any
absolute prohibitions on legal proceedings. The discretion granted
in the act to stay proceedings was considered sufficiently broad to·
cover all special cases.
"The subjects of probate proceedings and trusts were likewise
omitted. Those bodies of law can hardly be d~alt with for soldiers
and sailors without interfering with the adjustment of rights of all
decendents' estates whatsoever."
Judicial decisions give us little aid. Only one reported case has been
found which squarely decides upon the applicability of the act to proceedings in the administration of decedents' estates, and that is a decision of the Orphans' Court of Warren County, New Jersey.9 On the
other hand, the language of the act is very broad, and the courts have
frequently said that it should be given a liberal construction.10 The one
54 Stat. L. 1178 (1940) as amended by 56 Stat. L. 769 (1942).
Ferry, Rosenbaum, and Wigmore, "The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Rights Bill,"
12 lLL. L. REV. 449 at 470 (1918).
9 In re CooPs Estate, 19 N. J. Misc. 236, 18 A. (2d) 714 (1941).
10 Boone v. Lightner, - - U.S., - - 63 S. Ct. 1223 at 1231 (1943); Royster ·
v. Lederle, (C. C. A. 6th 1942) 128 F. (2d) 197 at 200; Helberg v..Warner, 319 Ill.
App. I17, 48 J:'T. E. (2d) 97_2 at 975 (1943); Laperouse v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 202
7
8
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decision referred to does decide that the act is applicable; and likewise
a few of the discussions of the act in legal periodicals express views indicative of its applicability to probate proceedings.11 Of necessity,
therefore, the conclusio~s suggested herein must be regarded as tentative. One cannot speak with finality as to the extent and character of the
application of the act to probate proceedings until the Supreme Court
of the United States has given its interpretation.
It is obvious that the significant sections of the act with respect to its
application to probate proceedings are contained in article II on "General Relief." In this connection, one should consider the various remedies provided: namely, the provision for the representation of a soldier
defendant before a default judgment is taken; the provision for an
attorney in any action or proceeding; the provision for setting aside a
judgment; the provision for a stay of proceedings; the provision for a
stay or vacation of executions, attachments and garnishments; and the
provision for the extension of periods of limitation. The question of the
applicability of the act may arise on the probate or contest of a will; on
the filing of a claim against the estate; on a judicial sale; on the settlement of an account; or on proceedings for distribution. It may arise
when the soldier is an heir or devisee; when he is a creditor of the
estate; when he is the executor or administrator; and, at least in the
case of absentee statutes, when the soldier is presumed to be the de. cedent.
Taking up the significant provisions of article II, one by one, it
should be observed that section 200, subsection ( r), relative to taking
a default, provides that "In any action or proceeding commenced in any
court, if there shall be a default of any appearance by the defendant,
the plaintiff, before entering judgment shall file in the court an affidavit
setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not in military service."
It may be argued that the decision of a probate court is not a judgment,
or that there are no defendants in a probate proceeding since the action
La. 686, 12 So. (2d) 680 at 682 (1943); In re Bashor, --Wash.--, 132 P. (2d)
1027 at 1028 (1943). But compare the following statement of Brandeis, J., speaking for the court with respect to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918:
"There is a further contention that the broad purpose of the Act declared in § 100,
demands'that it be liberally construed to include the situation presented by this case •••
The judicial function to be exercised in construing a statute is limited to ascertaining
the intention of the legislature therein expressed. A ca.us omissus does not justify
judicial legislation. Compare United States v. Weitzel, 246 U. S. 533, 543. This Act
is so carefully drawn as to leave little room for conjecture." Ebert v. Poston, 266 U. S,
548 at 553, 45 S. Ct. 188 (1925).
11 Reed, "Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940," 28 lowA L. REV. 14
at 29 ( l 942) ; Cogswell, "Application of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to
Probate Proceedings," 8 D. C. BAR ASSN. J. 398 (1941); Anderson, "The Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act," 6 Umv. DETROIT L. J. 163 at 170 (1943).
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is strictly ex parte. It would seem, however, that courts are likely to
interpret the term "defendant" very liberally so that it will mean
practically any party to an action or proceeding other than the persons
who initiated it. Thus, in a proceeding for tlie adoption of the infant
daughter of a soldier, which originated in the District Court of the
District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals determined that section 2or
of the act was applicable, and observed: 12 "The intention of Congress
and the purpose of the statute require a liberal interpretation of the
word defendant."
In re Cool's Estate,1 8 the single decision determining the applicability of the act to probate proceedings, involved a petition by an executor to present his account for confirmation and settlement. The court
held that section 2_00 of the act was applicable, that an affidavit relative to the military service of interested parties should have been filed,
and that, in an appropriate case,- an attorney should be appointed to
represent interested persons in military service. Judge Resecrans, in a
well considered opinion, said:
·
"The authorities hold that a plaintiff is a person asking any
relief by any form of proceeding (48 C.J. r2r8) and that the
term 'defendant' includes any other party as distinguished from
the plaintiff or complaining party, and means anyone who is a
necessary party to a complete determination of the action;
"
He further said:
"The definition of a 'judgment' as a final determination of the
rights of parties includes decrees of equity and probate courts.
30 Am. Jur. 822, tit. Judgments, § 3. Since the federal act is for ,
the purpose of protecting the rights of persons in military service
and any judgment affecting the rights of such persons may be
opened, stayed or vacated, a liberal construction should be accorded so that in probate court proceedings in default of any appearance by an interested party, either male or female, an affidavit
as to military service should be filed or. other action taken in
accordance with the federal act."
It should be observed that subsection (3) of section 200 eliminates
any question as to whether there can be any defendant in any probate
proceeding by using the phrase "action or proceeding in which a person
in military service is a party," and thus even more clearly indicates the
applicability of the section to probate proceedings. Section 200, subsection ( 4), which deals with vacating a judgment "rendered in any
12

18

In re Adoption of a Minor, (Ct. App. D. C. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 790.
See note 9, supra.
·
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action or proceeding governed by this section against any person in
military service" obviously applies to probate proceedings, if the earlier
parts of the section are applicable.
It would seem then that, if a person in military service is interested
as heir, next of kin, legatee or devisee, but does not appear, the court
should not proceed with a determination of the validity or invalidity of
a will, the settlement of an account or with an order of distribution
without providing for the representation of such person by counsel;
that if such person "was prejudiced by reason of his military service in
making his defense," the decree or determination may be vacated. An
affidavit that there are no defendants in military service, as provided
by the statute, would seem not to remedy the situation if in fact there
are such defendants. Doubtless the provision as to vacating a judgment
would also apply to a case where the person in military service had
brought an action as a creditor of the decedent or had applied for appointment as executor or administrator and the decision was adverse to
him.
Does this mean that no title is safe where it is derived from the
estate of a decedent and there is a possibility of a person in military
service claiming to set aside the decision on the ground that his interests
were prejudiced by his military service? Probably no such sweeping assertion can be made. The last sentence of section 200 reads as follows:
"Vacating, setting aside, or reversing any judgment because of any of
the provisions of this Act shall not impair any right or title acquired
by any bona fide purchaser for value under such judgment." Thus, the
title may not continue indefinitely to be defective; but it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the original distributee of the estate, who is
not a bona fide purchaser, must assume the risk of an attack on his title
by a person in military service.
Section 201 provides for a stay of "any action or proceeding in any
court in which a person in military service is involved." It is believed
that this provision would be applicable to probate proceedings in situations already discussed. But as the stay is in the discretion of the court,
no serious hardship to other litigants is likely to arise from the application of this provision in favor of a party in military service. Section 203
concerns the stay or vacation of executions, attachments and garnishments in the discretion of the court. While these methods of e:ffectuating the orders of a probate court are not usual, to the extent that they
are employed in connection with decedents' estates, it would seem that
the statute would apply.
Without doubt the most perplexing question in connection with the
application of the act to decedents' estates concerns section 20 5 involving statutes of limitation. Unlike other provisions, this is self executing
and is not subject to judicial discretion. It reads in part as follows:
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"The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law,
regulation, or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding
in any court, board, bureau; commission, department or other
agency of. gov~1;nment by or against any person in military service
or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns,
whether such cause of action or the right or privilege to institute
such action or proceeding shall have accrued prior to or during
the period of such service...."

.

This form of the act results from the amenchµents of 1942. The original form of section 205, which was identical with the corresponding
section of the Act of 1918,14 read as follows:
"The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law for
the bringing of any action by or against any person in military
service or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators, or
assigns, whether such cause of action shall have accrued prior to or
during the period of such service."
it is arguable that the original Act of 1940 had no application to
probate proceedings in so far as this section is concerned. It referred
only to "action" and not to "action or proceeding'' ~s did all the other
provisions for general relief. Moreover, the statement of the draftsmen
of the l 91 8 Act quoted at the beginning of this discussion would seem
to indicate that they did not regard this section as applying to probate
proceedings. However, in a case before the Missouri Court of Appeals,15 it was assumed, though not decided, that this section of the
l 91 8 Act applied to the period of the non-claim statute. And at least
two authors of recent discussions in periodicals have felt sure that the
1940 Act was applicable.16 The 1942 amendments were doubtless intended to include in the provision as to statutes of limitation proceedings before administrative boards, but it would seem that the effect was
also to make it clear that periods of limitation in probate proceedings
are within the act, whether or not they were formerly included.
If this is true, the consequences are far reaching. The following
periods could be ext~nded where persons in military service are involved: the period within which a will may be offered for probate or
may be contested where the person in military service is a distributee;
40 Stat. L. 440, § 205 (1918).
Bolz Cooperage Corp. v. Beardslee, 2II Mo. App. 109, 245 S. W. 6II (1922).
16 Reed, "Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940," 28 lowA L. REV. 14 at
31 (1942); Cogswell, "Application of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to
Probate Proceedings," 8 D. C. BAR AssN. J. 398 at 405 (1941).
14
15
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or where the person in military service is a creditor, the period within
which claims against the decedent must be filed; or where the person
in military service is a creditor and there was no administration proceeding whatever, the period within which all debts of the decedent
are barred. Thus, after the normal statutory period has elapsed, a devisee in military service may present a will for probate; an heir may
contest a will; or a creditor in military service may have a claim heard
after the period of the non-claim statute has expired. Moreover, it
would seem that a determination by the court that there is no person in
military service involved in the proceeding, would not prevent such a
person from asserting his rights.
It should, however, be clear that the extension of the statutory
period has no application to a case where the real party to the action
is not a soldier or sailor but the soldier or sailor, as executor or administrator of the estate of the real plaintiff or defendant, is prosecuting or defending the action. Thus, in a case where a soldier's wife
brought an action for personal injuries, and on her death while the
action was pending, her husband was appointed her executor, it was
held that the husband suing in his representative capacity was not
entitled to the benefit of the act with respect to the extension of the
period of limitations.17
In conclusion, something should be said as to the effect of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act on proceedings under statutes
which are designed to bind the estate of a presumed decedent even
though it subsequently appears that he is not in fact dead. It has long
been recognized that, in an ordinary probate proceeding, the fact of
death is jurisdictional; 18 and, therefore, if the presumed decedent is
not in fact dead, he may reclaim the estate even after a probate court
has distributed it. The Supreme Court of the United States asserted
as a reason for this doctrine that the presumed decedent, not having
been given any sort of notice, and not indeed being even a party to the
probate proceeding, was being deprived of his property without due
process of law by a judicial determination of his death under these,
circumstances.19 Since that time a number of statutes have been enacted to enable the probate court to acquire jurisdiction over the presumed decedent by giving him reasonable notice. These are of at least
two kinds: first, absentee statutes, which provide for the probate of
estates of persons who have been absent for a given period and are
presumed to be dead; 20 second, statutes providing for ordinary administration of decedents' estates, but making a special provision for
17

Halle v. Cavanaugh, 79 N. H. 418, l l l A. 76 (1920).
ATKINSON, WILLS 562, 563 (1937) and cases therein cited.
19
Scott v. McNeaI, 154 U.S. 34, 14 S. Ct. 1108 (1894).
20
See, for example, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) 27.3178 (321) to 27.3178 (351).

18
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notice to the presumed decedent in cases where administration is based
on a presumption of death. 21 As to the first type of statute, section 205
of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, as to the period of limitations, would appear to apply if there is a fixed period of absence before
this proceeding can be initiated. And, indeed, that section may extend
the period of the pr~umption of death as to the s~cond type of statute.
As to both types of statutes, it would seem-that, if there is any probability that the presumed decedent is in military service, he should be
represented by an attorney. And, in view of the fact situation presented
in such cases, it would seldom, if ever, be known positively that the
presumed decedent was not in military service. Thus it appears that the
attempt of modern legislation to bind a presumed decedent will often
be frustrated by the operation of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act. Though the act doubtless does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the presumed decedent who is in military service, it does permit him to make direct attack on the proceedings when he otherwise
could not do so.
L. M. S.

a

21 See Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1941) c. 3, §§ 252, 448, and 449; 1 Ill.
Laws 1941, p. 5, § 1.

